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Articles

Precognition and Backwards Causation

by Keith Seddon

This paper argues that whatever mechanism is responsible for precognition, at least one can be ruled out on conceptual grounds. That mechanism is backwards causation. If it is possible that events can have causes occurring later than the time they happen, it would be possible that our perceptions be caused earlier than the events they are perceptions of. This is shown to constitute a successful objection to Beloff’s view that there are circumstances imaginable which call for a backwards causation explanation. It is claimed that a backwards-process is nonsensical, in which case backwards-causal candidates cannot be tied to their effects.