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The Politics of Freedom

Value Pluralism & Plurality of Choice

Christophe Bruchansky looks at maximising the diversity of choice.

“Every man realises himself in realising a type of humanity”
Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, 1946.

In its broadest sense, pluralism has a general consensus behind it. Hardly anyone would argue that the co-existence of different types of people making different choices based on different opinions is a bad thing for society. And, from liberalism to anarchism to libertarianism, all value systems concerned with freedom of choice are in favour of diversity: not facilitating choices made by different types of people would not demonstrate different ways of thinking, and so could hardly be described as ‘freedom’, at all.

Utilitarian theories, with their maximisation of the sum of happiness, also rely on diversity. The assumption is that the more each of us pursue our own form of happiness, the bigger its overall sum will be. The utilitarian John Stuart Mill rightly concludes that, “In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others” (On Liberty, Chapter III, 1859). Egalitarianism too is about diversity: it is concerned with equality precisely because it cherishes people’s differences. To promote equality in a society where everybody acts and thinks the same would be of little value. According to Elizabeth S. Anderson, “Egalitarianism ought to reflect a generous, humane, cosmopolitan vision of a society that recognizes individuals as equals in all their diversity” (‘What Is the Point of Equality?’, Ethics 109, no. 2, 1999). Even traditionalists must welcome a certain dose of diversity, since all traditions are based on different roles assigned to people, each role coming with its own set of duties and responsibilities.

I could keep on going with a list of references from all currents of thoughts, but my purpose is not a comparative analysis of diversity in value systems. My point is that, while proponents of different value systems disagree on the nature and magnitude of desirable individual traits, none of them are seriously questioning the intrinsic value of diversity itself. Social movements that fight gender, sexual, racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination, are welcomed and most necessary; but it would be inaccurate to say they introduce a foreign notion of diversity into prevailing value systems. In fact, most of them leverage their system to make their moral point on the value of diversity. For instance, diversity is advocated in business with the explicit goal of making business fairer, not to challenge liberal values. If we could all participate in the free economy and all be judged solely on our economic performance, diversity could then only benefit the economy as a whole. And in public affairs, giving a voice to minority groups allows them to be included into existing political systems, not to challenge them. It is often championed by mainstream politicians who want to legitimise their power. Diversity is, in this case, nothing new and fits into well-established political discourse.

Paradoxically, then, in fact, what makes social movements about diversity so popular is that they are fuelled by moral monism; that is, to use the definition of philosopher John Kekes (The Morality of Pluralism, p.6, 1996), “the belief that there is one and only one reasonable system of values.” It is because people feel passionate about their understanding of justice, democracy and fairness that they feel so strongly about making it inclusive.

People in Motion by Dror Rosenski
Painting © Dror Rosenski 2024

Value Pluralism

In the words of the philosopher Isaiah Berlin, value pluralism states that “human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another” (Liberty, p.216, 2002). Value pluralism is more demanding than a simple belief in diversity. Such pluralism in its purest form (henceforth, I will use the term ‘pluralism’ as a synonym of ‘value pluralism’) is not only about choice and diversity in the context of a given value system, it is also about a plurality of value systems themselves. It’s about bringing together people who don’t share the same values, and so don’t base their decisions on the same principles of justice, equality, and fairness.

To quote John Kekes, value pluralism “wishes for us what we wish for ourselves” (The Morality of Pluralism, p.12), in that it doesn’t try to impose any ideology on us except that people should be free to believe the value system of their choice. This is a formidable proposition. Very few people will take to the streets to defend, not what they believe in, but the ability to think differently from their values. Indeed, the idea that we would fight for values we don’t believe in ourselves seems counterintuitive, and doomed to be unpopular. Why not simply fight for our personal understanding of what is right or wrong, of who deserves what, of what goal is worthwhile or not?

Kekes writes, “That our pursuits are plural is worthy of celebration because it makes life interesting, rich, full of possibilities, and provides one of the strongest motives why we should be interested in each other” (p.28). So the ultimate reason to live together might after all not be that we share values, but that we don’t, and we cherish the cognitive dissonance. Being truly pluralist is to engage in an existential quest where no single value system or universal narrative can determine our mutual existence: “Pluralists deny that there is an authoritative system of values and, consequently, that there is any value that is always overriding” (p.17). Pluralists take on the daunting task of challenging our convictions, not because they wish to prevent us from behaving according to our own values, but because they believe no value system should be placed above another.

Unsurprisingly, value pluralists often met with fierce resistance. Their arguments are brushed away. They are wrongly labelled as naïve, dangerous anarchists, or idealists with no sense of practicality. Here I want to describe some common myths surrounding value pluralism, and debunk them one by one, the myth of free choice, choice overload, and anarchy.

Consequential Choices

The first myth I’d like to debunk is a particularly vexing one for all pluralists. It is the false assumption that promoting diversity in choice means making our life choices inconsequential.

To choose to pursue academic studies, to get into a relationship, or to get into politics, are all consequential choices: they open some doors and close others. This is a paradox of free choice, as it makes free choice the freedom to restrict ourselves: to choose what part of our freedom we are ready to sacrifice for exercising other parts. But loss of a part of our freedom helps give meaning to a career, a love relationship, or a political engagement.

Free choice understood as the ability to pursue whatever we want without having to bear any consequences is a myth popularised by entertainment media and consumerist advertising. According to consumerism, the best way to promote pluralism would be to make all our choices as effortless as possible – to make them as easy as buying a product online and having it delivered to our door, seemingly without any consequences for us or the world around us. If only all our desires and ambitions could be streamlined into such a process, technological and industrial advances would take care of the rest of our problems while optimising production. We could then effortlessly purchase even more stuff, make even more choices, and feel as if we have even more opportunities to accomplish ourselves than before.

One big problem with this ‘consumerist’ interpretation of free choice is that, sooner or later, choices that are stripped of consequences lose a great deal of their meaning. Choosing to purchase one more thing online might come to not mean much to us anymore, as it might not represent a commitment to anything. Furthermore, if we don’t pay attention, consumer choices can be orchestrated by advertising so that we lose all perspective, such that, to use the words of Jean Baudrillard, “there is no danger of anything emerging within them that is not one spectacle or one sign among others” (The Consumer Society, p.122, 1998). Life becomes a play of signs, with no higher or more noble goal.

One might think that travelling is a nobler pursuit in life than just purchasing products. Travelling is about discovering new cultures and environments, and so opening up our horizons. And yet, anybody who has travelled a lot knows that even this is not without limits. The more trips we make, the less each new trip is likely to enrich our existence with novelty, even for the most open-minded of us. And just as with consumerism, exploration might become a nuisance, and act as a smoke screen preventing us from considering other choices in life.

Pluralists should refrain from taking sides in value systems, and so should not proclaim which out of consumerism or exploration is better, for instance. My point here is rather that any pursuit in life is meaningless if it becomes effortless. Yet value pluralism is not about making it easy to pursue or believe whatever we want, but about making meaningful choices. And for our pursuits to be meaningful, they need to be consequential, meaning, they need to restrict our future choices.

Consequential choice also has limits, though. Choices that determine one’s entire life in all its spheres are very unlikely to increase plurality of choice. Indeed, their consequences are so huge that they can make it impossible to pursue any other goal or change our value system. Such large consequences would make a small number of choices extremely meaningful; but at the expense of any other choices. So whatever career, relationship, or political allegiance we get into, they should never dictate our entire existence.

Pluralists want us to pursue what we believe: but not so easily the choice becomes meaningless, and not so laboriously that change becomes impossible. Far from the simplistic pursuit of easy choices, then, value pluralism is a subjective exercise that aims at maximising plurality of choice. Pluralists don’t promote free choice, then (that’s another myth), but rather, plurality of choice.

Life is full of competing values and choices; it would be impossible for us to choose them all. This is what makes choice so interesting, and existential: we simply cannot choose everything. The best way to promote plurality of choices is thus not to make all choices possible for everybody at all times, but to make sure that people can make meaningful choices that do not all belong to the same value system, so that, overall, a maximum of free choices are being explored and actualised in society.

Actualising Choices

To pursue the maximisation of individual choice, I need to be more nuanced in differentiating between consequential and inconsequential choices. Choices which are ‘inconsequential’, in how they don’t limit one’s future choices, can in other ways affect who we are. Travelling, eating vegetables, writing political posts on social media, might be relatively inconsequential decisions when each is taken on their own; it is their constant repetition that is consequential. When repeated, they become ways for people to affirm their convictions and reiterate their commitment to a value system. They become what I call realising or actualising choices. Making realising or actualising choices is important because this allows us to live out our values, embodying both them and our vision of what it means to be human.

Sometimes, our repetitive small choices might be made before we realise their significance. Enjoying a walk every morning might sound inconsequential, until we realise we could not live in a place that doesn't allow us to keep this routine. Choices which become habits might be tacit life choices. Therefore, pluralists must be careful when considering such choices, as they don’t work like decisions; they’re often unconscious, yet their collective importance can be enormous. Buying cheap clothes is a perfect example of a relatively inconsequential decision, as it requires little commitment from us. But all such inconsequential purchases, taken together, can have huge consequences on the environment, or on the welfare of factory workers.

Again, pluralists must refrain from judging the value system motivating these purchases. As a matter of fact, fashion can be instrumental in the creation of our personal identities, and so the actualisation of fashion choices can be significant. Fashion trends can also be considered a source of diversity.

Unfortunately, the human mind is not well equipped to compare easy frequent actualising choices with significant consequential choices. This is another reason consumerism isn’t a satisfactory system from a pluralist perspective: it doesn’t help us to make informed decisions, but instead exploits our tendency to avoid doing so.

One way for people to appreciate the meaning and consequences of their repeat actualising choices, is for them to not always be able to make them. Our trip might be cancelled, and this might create an opportunity to pursue something meaningful at home. Or I might not find the colour pullover I want to buy, and decide to keep wearing my old one.

Choosing Not To Choose

After the myth of free choice, a second widespread myth I would like to address is that plurality of choice is overrated and that people also need to embrace whatever comes in. Moreover, it is said, the belief that we could choose our value system is also presumptuous, as we are more determined by our social environment than we might realise.

There is some truth in this. We don’t choose where we come from; we don’t choose our abilities; and we barely choose our personality. So pluralists should not be seen as forcing any choice or creating artificial choices. They should also acknowledge that choice can be overwhelming, and that choosing not to choose is a choice on its own, and should be respected as such. Consumer choice can create an illusion of self-agency in a life determined by economic factors. Identity is another example of something for which people don’t necessarily want to make choices. Choosing our gender, cultural identity, or political affiliation, can be unbearable if having to make such a choice is imposed on us.

Unrealistic choices do not serve value pluralism either. Pluralists should discourage them because they might get in the way of choices that make a real difference. For example, knowledge that we cannot choose our cultural roots or social background doesn’t mean we should give up on values such as cosmopolitanism or equal opportunities, but that we should actualise our values through more realistic choices, such as cultural exchanges and pursuing social mobility. Quoting Isaiah Berlin again, “Knowledge liberates not by offering us more open possibilities amongst which we can make our choice, but by preserving us from the frustration of attempting the impossible” (Liberty, p.190).

Imaginary Choices

If we have the option not to choose, why should we concern ourselves with choices we don't want to make or cannot make? According to Kekes, the answer resides in our imagination: we need a “sufficiently developed imagination to enable us to form an adequate notion of the nature of our possibilities” (p.26).

Let me give you a personal example. I will never be an astronaut, and it has never been my dream. If I had pursued that goal since childhood, I might have become one, but that’s not certain, and it doesn’t make me sad. In any case, it is too late for me. I have made consequential choices in my life that made this choice now impossible. Should pluralists consider this wrong, and intervene so that it becomes possible for me? Given the current cost of space technology, I don’t think they should. The high budget would deprive many other people from more meaningful choices. It would decrease overall plurality of choice. Does this then mean I should not care about space travel and the opportunity others might have to travel into space? The answer is no: not simply because of altruism, but also because the fact I can imagine other people travelling into space extends my own possibilities. Each time I see an astronaut, it reminds me of my passion for exploring the unknown, which is an integral part of my value system; and we can all explore the unknown in many different ways. I do it through writing. So the astronaut reminds me why I enjoy exploring the unknown. Space travel might also influence my creative process. It might also reinforce some of my beliefs and influence some of my choices.

Freedom of choice doesn’t need to be selfish, and the ability to think about others and imagine their choices simply because it pleases our imagination, is an integral part of our freedom. Indeed, there can be no freedom without imagination: the first step in any of our decisions is to imagine what our options are – and this is greatly influenced by the choices other people can make and have made. Choosing to not choose can be a valuable choice; but choosing not to imagine what our options in life could be, can only be harmful for ourselves, and for society as a whole.

Conclusion: The Myth of Anarchy

This brings us to one last myth: that promoting pluralism is hopeless because it deals with value systems that are impossible to compare, and their combination can only lead to anarchy.

However, this myth only shows us how much moral monists can be blind to the subjectivity of their own value system. Equality, justice, happiness, utility are examples of values that are impossible to measure. Different systems might in some cases provide fairly straightforward comparisons, but in most cases don’t.

Let’s consider the rankings developed to compare quality of life across the globe, including perceived happiness, press freedom, equality, and education. These might be fairly objective when comparing entries at the top with those at the bottom of the rankings; but what about comparing the ranking of the first five entries, or of the last five entries – can that be objective? All these measures might be based on facts; but that doesn’t make the sort of ranking they lead to perfectly objective. Concluding that one society is better than another because it performs better based on some criteria will always be subjective. This doesn’t stop academics and legislators alike regularly proposing new measures of equality, fairness, happiness and the common good. Nor does it prevent entire political systems from relying on these arbitrary measures to gauge their own values and effectiveness.

Pluralists acknowledge their own subjectivity, while moral monists refuse to acknowledge the subjectivity of their value system. But this advantage doesn’t make pluralists hostile towards monism. Monists should understand that while pluralists challenge the universality of their principles, as value pluralists they still value them. This is what sets apart value pluralism from anarchism: anarchists deem all value systems irrelevant, while pluralists want a maximum of them to coexist and flourish. Pluralists are not naive defenders of freedom, nor anarchists threatening to destroy all value systems. Subjectivity is not preventing us from making decisions but, on the contrary, is encouraging us to always motivate our choices, to always give them a subjective and aesthetic value. Pluralism is not less practical than monism, but it is closer to human nature, closer to its paradoxes and uncertainties. And it is what makes it preferable.

Christophe Bruchansky is a Belgian author and digital artist: bruchansky.name.