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Rantings and Ravens • Arguing with himself? • How Soon Is Now? • Mothers and Gods • Humpty Dumpty Theology • Valid and True • Long-Winded Proofs • To Know All Isn’t To Forgive All… • Challenge Everything!

Rantings and Ravens

DEAR EDITOR

In his article on Hempel’s Raven Paradox in Issue 19, Fred Leavitt seems to mix up definitions, descriptions and hypotheses. His example “Water at sea-level boils at 100°C” is a definition, whereas “All ravens are black” is not, though it could be a hypothesis. If it is taken as one, then ‘black’ cannot be part of the definition of ‘raven’, otherwise you beg the question. All you can do is to assume the hypothesis to be true on the available evidence. If a green raven comes along, it’s up to you whether you distinguish it from black ones. If you do, and you’re interested in nothing much except ravens, blackness and logic, your descriptive system of the world would put any object into one, and one only, of the following four categories: black, nonblack, raven, non-black raven.

MICHAEL BULLEY
ASHFORD, KENT

DEAR SIR

To my admittedly amateur eye Hempel’s Raven Paradox seems to suffer from the weakness that it does not consider the case if ravens may not exist. Perhaps it will be better to substitute Yeti for raven. We then have:

P0: Yetis do not exist
Pl: All Yetis are black
P2: All nonblack things are not Yetis.
E1: This Yeti is black.
E2: This white thing is not a Yeti.

E1 disproves P0 and provides evidence for P1, but E2 is consistent with P0 and P1 – which are mutually contradictory.

We can of course forget P0 if we have prior knowledge that some Yetis do exist.In fact prior knowledge seems to be the key to the seeming paradox. In Professor Leavitt’s example of two black ravens and 98 nonblack nonravens in the aviary we only know that one black raven provides 50% of the evidence that all ravens are black if we know there are only two ravens, and that therefore it is quicker to examine them rather than the 98 others. Reverse the numbers, i.e. 98 ravens, and it is quicker to concentrate on the nonravens.

If we have no prior knowledge of even the approximate ratio between the two types then we can have no preference.

The paradox therefore boils down to the message that if you do not use all available information you may not use the shortest proof.

YOURS SINCERELY,
GORDON HAINES
SHOTTISHAM, SUFFOLK

Arguing with himself?

DEAR SIR

I thank K.M. Brooks for his letter (Issue 19) in reply to my defence of Solipsism (Issue 18). The simple answer to his question is that by ‘present’ I was referring to the psychological present and not the physical present.

The physical present is indeed a mere point in a one-dimensional continuum – not forgetting the possibility that on some quite small scale space-time may actually be quantised into discrete points rather than being a continuum. But the psychological present is somewhat different. It extends, first of all, over a substantial period of physical time, vaguely about a second in length. Secondly, a ‘time slice’ of the external world is built up by some complex process by the mind during this moment and presented to our awareness, with events all reproduced preserving correct temporal order, but somehow as if all present simultaneously.

One such psychological present moment is followed, apparently seamlessly, by the next, and so on. Going the other way: time-intervals of less than a tenth of a second, say, are not generally discernible by us.

Events in time-slices other than the present are only accessible to us by an indirect mechanism: memory – in the case of the past, or more generally by reasoning. Our sense-perceptions in the psychological present moment have quite arbitrary characteristics; they could be almost anything, and they are not essentially different to those of any other moment: what makes the present moment stand out from all others is our direct conscious awareness.

I am directly aware of my present sense-perceptions: that means, I am 100% certain of their existence and quality, even if they should later prove to be illusory with respect to the external world. I am directly aware of, and 100% certain of, my existence as the spectator of these senseperceptions and author of acts on the perceived world. I am aware of my whole situation vis-à-vis the world. I am aware that I am aware. But everything else is conditional.

I cannot know for certain – or at all – what I was experiencing at any moment before the present, because the past is not 100% knowable. The past is only knowable from the traces it leaves in the present – and even they could prove illusory – even totally illusory (how do I know that I haven’t just this minute flown in from a parallel universe?). In reality, I go by the evidence and adopt the most reasonable or easiest choice. In fact, there is no unique past, even in the most reasonable view, only a range of probabilities, because of quantum uncertainty.

Similarly, there is no completely predetermined future, and in the extreme view I have no idea at all what I will be experiencing next – or after that. In the end we die – and part company definitely with the present external world onto, I presume, a totally unconnected and unknowable path of continuing and endless awareness, no doubt through endless other similar worlds to the present. I find it impossible to picture a state of permanent unawareness.

I see no place in all this for the existence of other consciousnesses than my own. Other consciousnesses would be an excess of explanatory entities. But here is a contradiction I can’t resolve: in my dealings with other people I assume that they are conscious like everybody else does.

CHRISTOPHER TILLEY
CORNWALL

How Soon Is Now?

DEAR SIR

In K.M. Brooks’ response to the defense of solipsism (Issue 19), he argues that I cannot know that I exist in the present moment because I do not know if the present moment exists – but this is to confuse the issue.

I do not exist because of the present moment, rather the present moment is because I exist. That is, the present moment only exists existentially (or, in me); it is not a thing in itself.

My present moment is merely an arbitrary place in time, a point between everything before my ‘now’ and everything after my ‘now’. To use an analogy, the descent of a pendulum’s swing is my history, the ascent my future, but the place where the pendulum is neither rising nor falling is my present moment, or ‘now’. It is a place without motion and, therefore, changeless. The present moment, then, is time zero. This is apparent when one recognizes that time is no more than a measurement of change (Aristotelian). Time, then, also is not a thing in itself.

Therefore, to say that I exist in the present moment is to say no more than I exist. And Mr. Brooks’ attempt to question the reality of the present moment in no way challenges my knowledge of my existence.

Therefore, if one desires to challenge the solipsists’ knowledge of their existence, perhaps one should not do so in relation to time, but in relation to change?

YOURS SINCERELY,
DAVID MUIR
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, CANADA

Mothers and Gods

DEAR EDITOR

Rachel Williams, in her letter (Issue 19) disagrees with me when I say there is no reason for believing in God or any other supernatural entity. The analogy she tries to draw, between believing in the existence of her mother and believing in the existence of God, does not hold; because her mother, unlike God, can be perceived. If we can perceive a person then we have the best reason there is, not merely to believe but to claim to know that that person exists.

Since God cannot be perceived and is also beyond all human conceptualisation, it is generally agreed that we need faith in order to accept His existence. But faith cannot be used as a reason for belief, because the meaning of the word ‘faith’ is too close to the meaning of the word ‘belief’. If we had a reason for our belief in God we would not need faith. But since we need faith it follows that we lack a reason for believing in God.

In her final paragraph Ms Williams attributes to me an argument that I did not and would not use. I am not a total sceptic and have no difficulty in accepting the existence of things that can be perceived. I have therefore not “committed the age-old sceptic’s paradox.” She concludes by begging me to return to a more sensible way of thinking. But what can be more sensible than basing one’s arguments on what can be perceived by the senses? I cannot see how I can return to a way of thinking I already hold.

YOURS SINCERELY,
PETER C HORN
BEDFORD

Humpty Dumpty Theology

DEAR EDITOR

I certainly agree with David Leyshon (Issue 19) that there is no intrinsic conflict between Christianity and Philosophy, though my reasons may not be his. In fact I suspect that many apparent contrasts between various religions are a matter of surface grammar rather than actual disagreement.

Nevertheless, if the word ‘Christian’ means anything at all it must be possible to be non-Christian. The word is often misused, sometimes deliberately.

“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”

“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master – that’s all.”

IAN TONOTHY
CROYDON

Valid and True

DEAR EDITOR

What a pity to have your otherwise nice magazine disfigured by the thoroughly erroneous definition of logic which regularly appears in your Philosophy in a Nutshell. Not truth, but logical consequence, is the central notion of logic, hence the one to which meaning clarification should be directed. Moreover, logic is concerned with determining validity, not truth, of arguments. Propositions are true or false; but arguments are valid or invalid – an argument being valid just in case its conclusion is a logical consequence of its premises. (Discussion is here confined to deductive, as opposed to inductive, logic.) I hope you will correct this downright glaring mistake.

SINCERELY,
ROGER SMOOK
GUELPH, ONTARIO
CANADA

(Point taken! We’ve changed it now. Eds)

Long-Winded Proofs

DEAR EDITOR

Stephen Ferguson’s article ‘What is the Philosophy of Mathematics?’ (Issue 19) was interesting, but it was marred by the sort of howler that gives philosophers a bad name. He argues (or quotes Dummett as arguing, it is not clear which) that it is impossible to prove Goldbach’s conjecture (that every even number greater than two is the sum of two primes) because such a proof would necessarily be infinitely long. He (or Dummett) fails to see that just because an exhaustive search for counterexamples would never finish, it does not follow that all other approaches would likewise fail.

A good example of this is Fermat’s last theorem. A direct proof would have to cover an infinite number of cases. If the argument Ferguson presents were correct, it would follow that the theorem could not be proved. This is plainly false, as a proof has indeed been found. I only hope that Ferguson’s statement is in fact an oversimplification of a less obviously fallacious position.

REGARDS,
JEREMY HENTY
(RECEIVED BY EMAIL)

To Know All Isn’t To Forgive All…

DEAR EDITOR

Considering the claim made by Martin Tyrrell (Issue 19), that God’s omniscience and the associated predestination theories necessarily negate Christian practice, I think a closer examination is merited.

We may accept that God knows before people even live whether they are going to be damned or saved. Yet, this being so, it seems consistent to suggest that the life people actually do lead in their lives is still relevant with regard to their judgment In very basic terms, a person, in accepting their predestination, may respond in one of two ways:

(a) God already knows whether He will damn or save me, but I don’t know which – so I’ll live a certain kind of life (that, as it turns out is, in God’s eyes, a righteous life – and so be saved).

(b) God already knows whether He will damn or save me, but I don’t know which – so I’ll live a certain kind of life (that, as it turns out is, in God’s eyes, a damnable life – and so be damned).

In both cases God’s judgment is not random but is directly related to the worthiness of the life led. That God knew all along whether you were going to choose (a) or (b) it does not follow that it makes no difference which it actually is. The difference is, theoretically vast.

YOURS SINCERELY,
MAURICE SUCKLING
OXFORD

P.S. On the face of it, (a) seems better

DEAR EDITOR

I was very interested in Dr Tyrrell’s article in Issue 19, entitled ‘Oh Lord, won’t You buy me a Mercedes-Benz?’. Well argued though the piece is, I believe there is one piece of reasoning which should not go unchallenged; Dr Tyrrell wrote, “God, he (John Calvin) argues, is omniscient; no Christian denies that.”

Dr Tyrrell attributes omniscience (all knowing) to God; he continues to argue, “Calvinist predestination follows logically from the characteristics Christians ascribe to God.” Acceptance of Calvinism rests on God’s absolute sovereignty (not only knowing all things, but ordering all things according to His will).

I agree with Dr Tyrrell that these attributes of God follow logically from the Christian understanding of God; in fact I would go so far as to say that if God is not really all powerful, He is not worth passing the time of day with, never mind serving and worshipping. However, the conclusion that Calvinism “paradoxically seems to negate much Christian practice”, such as ‘prayer’, would make John Calvin turn in his grave.

Dr Tyrrell has not properly considered the full implications of the idea of an all powerful, all knowing, all seeing God. Surely nothing is impossible for such a God! He is more than able to so order and rule this world that the prayers of Christians are part of His plan. This kind of power may be beyond the full comprehension of us, but that is because we are not all knowing and all powerful.

To look at things from another logical angle; What good would it do for a person to pray to God if He was not all powerful and all knowing? Such a caricature would not only be unable to answer prayer, but would not know what is best for those concerned. That is why omniscience and sovereignty are not paradoxical, but essential for prayer.

YOURS SINCERELY,
PETER SANLON
CEPHASPETROS@HOTMAIL.COM

DEAR SIR

I greatly enjoyed Issue 19, finding it informative and thought provoking. In particular, Dr Martin Tyrrell’s article “Oh Lord, Won’t You Buy Me A Mercedes-Benz?” has stimulated my grey cells, prompting me to put fingers to keyboard.

Dr Tyrrell’s treatment of Christianity is refreshing. While concurring wholeheartedly with the assertion that “Calvinist predestination follows logically from the characteristics Christians ascribe to God,” I feel that two points raised must not go unanswered.

Firstly, to conclude that much of Christian practice is redundant and then to brashly state “prayer is pointless” is erroneous in the extreme. Calvin himself explains that God hears prayer, and that prayer has been ordained not so much for God’s benefit as for the believer’s. In fact, in his Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin finds no difficulty in listing six reasons for praying. The Christian prays out of a deep sense of gratitude to the God who promises eternal life and who allows the believer the privilege of approaching Him and calling him Father. The prayer paradox Dr Tyrrell identifies exists only in the unbeliever’s mind.

Secondly, following Schopenhauer, it is concluded that an omniscient and omnipotent God condemns and punishes out of nothing more than a vengeancefuelled capriciousness. To conclude thus is disingenuous to the claims of Christianity. The God of the Bible does not punish in a fit of Divine pique, but because he is holy. The antithesis of holiness, or perfection, is sinfulness; in God’s eyes everyone is a sinner and must be judged and punished. Those whom God saves have had that punishment they deserve met in full by the death of Jesus Christ on the cross; this act of salvation encapsulates a characteristic of God overlooked by Dr Tyrrell and Schopenhauer grace. Indeed, in the penultimate line of the article, Dr Tyrrell unwittingly provides a description of the believer’s experience of God’s grace: “It humbles our delusions of complete personal control and encourages some much needed modesty.”

On a more general point, Dr Tyrrell is correct to challenge Christianity in the philosophical arena; if the extravagant claim of Jesus Christ, recorded in the Bible, “I am the way, the truth and the life” is not worthy of scrutiny and investigation, what is? I am convinced that.

Christianity as expressed in the Bible can stand up to, and repel, the most vigorous challenges that can be made by the philosophical constituency. The Bible is the ultimate source of authority for all men, taking precedence over tradition and, dare it be said, philosophical reason. But to make a challenge without paying heed to what the Bible actually says is poor scholarship, which can only lead to wrong conclusions and the perpetuation of ignorance and misunderstanding.

By definition, the questions raised by death (Where do we go? Do we have souls? Is there an afterlife?) will be eternally relevant. In contrast, the National Lottery is of only transient significance. I would contend that it is only in Christianity that we find the eternal answers to the eternal questions.

YOURS SINCERELY,
WILLIAM SCHOLES
BELFAST

Challenge Everything!

DEAR EDITOR

With reference to your editorial, ‘Does Philosophy Cause Nihilism?’ it is unfair of you to say that philosophy is unlike history or astronomy because these can be read about “in a totally passive way, accepting without query the assertions of the author (whilst) still genuinely learning something in the process.”

I agree that philosophy is an activity that can be described as “questioning assumptions and criticising arguments” but believe that such an activity is fundamental to life, since the “unexamined life is not worth living.” Anyone who reads an article in the way you describe cannot learn anything truly genuine about history or astronomy. An article which leads one to regard the views of the author as doctrine cannot possibly be “well written” especially since so many advances have been made in applying philosophy to the various academic disciplines. Learning cannot be genuine unless thought goes into it. After all, a parrot can learn to repeat what it is taught.

YOURS SINCERELY,
JULIE HALL,
WOOD GREEN, LONDON