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Thoughts on Thoughts on Thoughts • Get Smarter • Decoding A Decoding • A Swift Rebuttal • Basic Arithmetic • A Message on Meaning

Thoughts on Thoughts on Thoughts

Dear Editor: As highlighted by Jonathan Moens (‘From Birds to Brains’, PN 164), starling murmuration provides a striking example of ‘emergence’. However, emergence is not a distinct mystery in its own right, but an illustration of that remarkable power of mathematical relationships to generate close approximations to far more complex relationships. Thus, the exact behaviour of a flock of starlings at a particular instant is simply the sum of the responses of each individual starling to the changing positions of its neighbours. However, the sum turns out to approximate closely to that apparently inexhaustible repertoire of continually changing patterns that our brains extract from visual input. So it is with all emergent phenomena. The paradox is that apparently new information (the emergent behaviour) is really the result of a loss of information (the approximation).

With this in mind, I strongly support Moens in his call for students of consciousness to heed the analogy with life. Too many writers on consciousness are stuck in seeking a single over-arching explanation of all the different experiences that make up consciousness. Yet we can be conscious of feeling, of sensing, of calculating, of verbally communicating, of paying attention, of recognizing, of identifying with self, and so on. Each of these types of experience demands its own explanation, as well as an explanation of how they interplay and reinforce each other – in the same sort of way that reproduction, bio-thermodynamics, homeostasis and the other capabilities of life has each required its own explanation rather than being attributable to the presence of one special ingredient, the elan vitale. Moreover, it is misleading to suggest that ‘emergence’ is in itself an explanation for any of them; but it does give a name to a type of explanation, which identifies properties emerging from complex interactions between known ingredients rather than looking for a new ingredient. That approach has borne fruit in the study of life, so should be the leading candidate in the study of consciousness. I would add that the fact that consciousness is something only understood from ‘inside’ also needs to inform the approach taken, and that an objective account of subjectivity is a contradiction in terms.

Roger S Haines, Ealing, London

Dear Editor: Thanks to Roger Haines for his article in Issue 164; in particular, the subsection on ‘making decisions’.

I found his hypothesis of ‘conscious to unconscious to conscious’ plausible. A little over twenty years ago, I was diagnosed with type 2 diabetes, and, during the period when my doctor was deciding what were the appropriate drugs and dosages needed to restore equilibrium to my system, I experienced two or three episodes of hypoglycaemia. During one of these episodes I was conscious that I had to make a decision; but I was unable to make a decision, because my unconscious was not presenting my consciousness with options. The decision I had to make was not an onerous one, and was unlikely to have serious consequences were it to be wrong. I had made decisions like it many times in the past. But, on this occasion, my unconscious was not offering me options despite me consciously willing it to provide some, which I knew existed. The episode lasted around a minute, and I do not think others who were present were aware of the difficulty I was having because I was still conversing lucidly.

When I informed my doctor of all this, he told me that others had reported it happening to them. It happened only once more to me, but, on that occasion, I was aware that it was similar to the earlier episode and would pass. Happily, in the space of a few weeks from diagnosis, we were able to establish a regime where good glucose control was achieved and has been sustained ever since.

On a different note, far be it from me, a non-classical scholar, to cavil about Dr Tallis’s ancient Greek. Yet in Issue 163 he states, correctly, that the word ‘atom’ derives from a Greek word meaning indivisible, indicating that the word is ‘ atmos’. But the Greek word for ‘indivisible’ is ‘ atomos’ from ‘ a temnein’ meaning ‘not cut’. ‘ Atmos’ means ‘vapour’ as in ‘atmosphere’. But I am sure Dr Tallis is emotionally robust enough not to have a fit of the vapours at such small-minded nit-picking (from the west Germanic ‘ hnitu’).

Alasdair Macdonald, Glasgow

Dear Editor: The article ‘Iain McGilchrist’s Naturalised Metaphysics’ in Issue 164 described McGilchrist’s fascinating and impressive ideas about the different ways in which the brain’s left and right hemispheres (LH and RH for short) affect the way we think. For example, it appears that LH activity tends to lead to ideas in line with philosophical materialism, while RH activity is associated with being open to what is paradoxical and hidden. McGilchrist thinks that, based on this knowledge about the brain, we can correct our metaphysical views. In particular, he thinks that, taking account of the tendencies of the LH, we have reasons to oppose metaphysical materialism. In this he seems to advocate using the RH to understand the world. But suppose that a person (let’s call him John) considers that there are irrefutably logical reasons for believing in materialism. Consequently, it appears to John that materialism cannot possibly be false. McGilchrist could respond by saying that there is extensive evidence that such materialist beliefs are caused by LH activity. However, if John is unable to conceive of how materialism can possibly be wrong, then McGilchrist’s argument is unlikely to persuade him. Furthermore, I don’t think that John should be persuaded by his argument. If it appears to him that a particular thing must be true, then he is justified in sticking to that position until such time as it no longer appears necessarily true to him.

Personally, I don’t believe in materialism, and, in some ways, it sounds as if McGilchrist’s beliefs about reality are similar to mine. But the reason I have those views is that, when I examine various arguments about the issue I am unable to see how materialism can be correct. It also seems to me that attempting to persuade materialists to change their minds by the use of anti-materialist arguments avoids the problems of McGilchrist’s approach. Rather, it creates the possibility that one of us might change the mind of the other in a way which is philosophically justifiable: ie, by demonstrating the logic of our position.

Peter Spurrier, Halstead, Essex

Get Smarter

Dear Editor: In his article ‘We’re As Smart As The Universe Gets’ (Issue 164), James Miles tells us that “Natural groups are transcended at exactly the point brains reach the complexity to allow shared concepts, which catapults group size upwards and starts culture and civilisation; but everything comes to a grinding halt evolutionarily speaking. Because our behaviour is no longer an expression of natural selection in operation, after this point evolution cannot, and will not, make those beings any smarter. This means that we are, and must be, the smartest beings the universe can get to naturally.” Well, no doubt our group behaviour is partly determined by culture; but at an individual level natural selection can continue to have a significant effect, since the genes of the individual best able to attract a mate and provide for any resulting offspring will still be more likely to be passed on. Higher intelligence is more likely to succeed in an increasingly complex world, and will therefore be more attractive to a potential mate. And so higher intelligence can certainly be naturally (well, specifically, sexually) selected for. There’s also the Flynn effect: that average IQ scores have been rising over the decades, leading to an increase of at least thirty points on average over the last century. Also, in fact human intelligence varies a lot, with some having intelligence way above the average. If our intelligence covers such a wide range, what exactly does Mr Miles mean when he says that ‘our’ intelligence and that of any aliens out there is as good as it gets? The considerable spread in human intelligence make his core assertion meaningless.

Paul Buckingham, Annecy, France

Dear Editor: In Issue 164, James Miles tells us that our human intelligence is as good as it naturally gets. This is, he says, because we are no longer wholly dependent on family groups. Instead, “Groups of one hundred family members [have] become non-family groups of thousands or hundreds of thousands… this means that in our culture there’s now no longer anything for natural selection to operate on – which means no natural selection pressure to get smarter.” But there is something for natural selection to operate on. A person of higher intelligence is more likely to be successful in an increasingly complex world, and so be more attractive to a potential mate. Darwin says as much in The Descent of Man, 2nd edition, Chapter V, ‘Intellectual Facilities’. He is clearly of the view that intellect is as important a heritable and selectable trait as is physical strength.

As for our unexpectedly compassionate nature, I would suggest that the belief in an increasingly sophisticated legal system as the better means of settling differences has had the effect of reducing the perceived need to be antagonistic towards each other in order to achieve our goals in life.

Heather Waite, West Bromwich

Dear Editor: Where to start with Steven Jay Gould’s idea of humans as a ‘remarkably genial people’? With the long view. There is still a wish amongst some to think we should be more like Rousseau’s ‘noble savage’. But we have ‘modern savages’ – hunter gatherers in the rain forests of New Guinea and the Amazon, living in ways similar to their ancestors, in the same forests, with none of the trappings of modern life. Anthropologists have recorded the percentage of male deaths through intertribal warfare in eight different tribes here, as varying from between 15% to 55%. In contrast we see an average male death-rate in Europe and the USA by reason of war in the twentieth century of only 1% – a period that included two incredibly deadly world wars.

Why so much violence in the forest? According to the anthropologists, the answer is that, in a forest, you do not know when another tribe will attack you, and the best form of defence is attack, so it’s better to seek out the other tribe in order to take them by surprise before they can do the same to you. But by virtue of a justice system provided by the state, we have a culture which treats large-scale sociability as the norm and no longer allows us to act aggressively in order to survive. We’ve learned the benefit of acting differently from the other primates.

Thomas Jeffries, Coleshill

Dear Editor: Yes, it is self-conceit to claim that intelligence reaches its apogee in humans, James Miles (PN 164)! Just try to follow the intricacies of the Krebs cycle, which releases oxygen from carbon dioxide. Sure, humans have figured out how it works; but it was single-cell organisms that invented, implemented and refined the process – billions of years ago, no less. Without them, we’re nothing. So who’s the smarter? Moreover, at a time when human activity is polluting the biosphere, causing mass extinctions, melting the ice caps, and disrupting climate, while keeping overkill levels of nuclear weapons at the ready, holding up humans as the pinnacle of intelligence shows that we’re as deluded as the universe gets.

Carlos Rumbaut, Austin, Texas

Decoding A Decoding

Dear Editor: JR Dickerson’s review of the film Love Lies Bleeding (PN 164) claims there’s an ideology hidden beneath the film’s flashy surface: “The spellbinding flow of images lead you ever deeper into transgender ideology,” she complains. She also disapproves of the ideology itself. Since Philosophy Now is aimed at anyone with a general interest in philosophy, some readers may be unaware of what ‘transgender ideology’ is, and may know nothing of the angry split among feminists over it. There are, in fact, many possible views that one might have about transsexuality; but in this particular Culture War, these views have largely divided into two camps. On the one hand are those who view transexuals as a positive feature of society, contributing to the feminist criticism of fixed gender position; on the other hand is a hostility to transsexuality. Dickerson belongs in the latter group. But because she does not spell this out clearly for readers, she could herself be accused of disguising her ideology. I personally had to read the article several times before I understood exactly what she was saying. Moreover, choosing this particular film to express her anti-transsexual views is on the face of it, somewhat bizarre: there are no transsexual characters, and transsexuality is never mentioned in the dialogue. In recent years there have been many portrayals of transsexuals in films and on TV; but Dickerson focusses instead on a film which, she claims, expresses its sympathy in a covert manner, which she proceeds to decode for our benefit.

Some of her interpretations are, in my view, of doubtful validity. For instance, she claims that the film’s central character, competitive bodybuilder Jackie, “codes as male in all but phallus.” I would dispute this. Her pretty, feminine facial features do not look remotely masculine; nor does her body look like the bodies of most men. Rather, bodybuilding is a form of body-modification which might be compared to the more extreme forms of plastic surgery. One of the ideological messages Dickerson blames the film for promoting is that “truly cool lesbians get turned on by, and have sex with, male-bodied people.” I don’t accept that Jackie is ‘male-bodied’. And Dickerson should read some of the social media posts about the film from gay women, notable for their lascivious appreciation! Another message that Dickerson disapproves of, is that “Injecting pharmaceuticals… provides an unproblematic way of changing your body to make it fit the image you want”. She’s referring to the use of steroids, a well-known feature of the bodybuilding sub-culture. But her use of the term ‘pharmaceuticals’ hints at the underlying target of her concern: injecting hormones is one of the ways transexuals change their bodies to more closely resemble their preferred sex. Dickerson also claims that “there is only one type of ‘woman’ who realistically could do all the things that Jackie does in the movie – and we all know which ‘women’ I’m talking about”. I’m not sure who ‘we’ is supposed to refer to here: I’m sure many readers would not know what she’s talking about – although the use of scare quotes is a clue that she’s referring to transgender women. In her ideology they can never be truly women, but only ‘women’. This aggressive aversion towards people claiming to change their gender is a central feature of the trans-exclusionary feminism that Dickerson represents.

These are issues that certainly deserve debating in a serious manner, and philosophy could, I think, bring some much-needed clarity to the debate. The respected philosopher Judith Butler, for example, has discussed these controversies in her recent book Who’s Afraid of Gender? But the issues cannot be decided by noting their oblique presence in a film which is more about genre-bending than gender-bending (is it a thriller, comedy, romance, parody, or what?). I think it is regrettable that Philosophy Now published this disguised apologia for transphobia.

Peter Benson, London

A Swift Rebuttal

Dear Editor: After reading Susan Andrews’ article, ‘Taylor Swift: A Philosopher For Our Times’ in Issue 164, I shook my head and rubbed my eyes repeatedly, thinking it just cannot be. It is mind boggling to me that anyone would describe this hyper-commercialized pop performer as ‘authentic’ (perhaps Andrews’ next article will be, ‘Charlie Manson: A Humanist For Our Times’). Authentic? None of us have seen Swift prior to hours of work by make-up artists. None of us have heard her voice except for what is produced after sound engineers and technical equipment have done their work. So, in one line Swift mentions Aristotle (“You know how to ball, I know Aristotle”) – and from that line Andrews takes seriously that she knows anything about the philosopher? Someone should interview Swift to let her demonstrate her knowledge of him. I’ll wager it’s pretty shallow (although on her album The Tortured Poets Department, she does get it right with the line ‘I’m no Patti Smith’). Sorry, but this overly-produced mass performer has not paid the price to earn the titles ‘artist’ or ‘philosopher’, and her act is the antithesis of authenticity.

David Wright, Sacramento, CA

Basic Arithmetic

Dear Editor: There is a third answer to Peter Worley’s question in Issue 164, ‘What does 2 + 2 make: 4, or 22?’ On a planet with 4-fingered creatures who use base 4 mathematics, they might say ‘10’.

Dr Hillary J. Shaw, Newport

Anger & Violence In Philosophy Now

Dear Editor: In Issue 163, David Ashton proposes an interesting critique of the Stoic view of anger. However, what he describes as ‘anger’ seems to be closer to ‘violence’. As reported in the article, Stoics consider anger a negative feature of human nature because of how it discourages responding to external events with wisdom, justice, and moderation. So the Stoic view seems to criticize the way people process and externalize anger, not the feeling itself. This view seems to be supported by author himself, who gives examples from Picasso and Nina Simone to highlight how anger can be converted to creativity and non-violent protest. These elements make me think that his talk of ‘anger’ should be replaced with ‘violence’, since he does not refer to the feeling itself, but to the verbal, behavioural and physical consequences generated by the inability to externalize sentiments with wisdom, justice, and moderation.

Valeria Andreoni

A Message on Meaning

Dear Editor: I enjoyed Issue 162 with its various articles on meaning, although I must respectfully disagree with Ruben David Azevedo’s argument about our significance. I cannot see any link between complexity and significance: just think of the importance of simple bacteria, algae, fungi and nematodes. More fundamentally, his idea that we may be ‘the apex of cosmic evolution’ solely because we are conscious seems very anthropocentric. Our existence does not hinge on consciousness alone; rather, an intricate interdependence of all life forms sustains ecosystems and life on the planet, often without conscious awareness. So this web of life demonstrates that significance cannot be exclusively derived from consciousness, but should also encompass the myriad roles all organisms play. The claim that conscious life is the ‘goal’ of evolution sounds even more problematic to me. Evolution is not a directed process with predefined objectives or endpoints. Rather, it is an undirected mechanism driven by random mutations and natural selection. This means that life evolves without an aim or purpose.

So while consciousness may provide us with a unique perspective, it should not diminish the intrinsic value of other life forms. In essence, every organism, regardless of its level of consciousness, matters profoundly in maintaining life on Earth. So please let’s keep our feet on the ground, and do away with any feelings of superiority.

Caroline Deforche, Belgium