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Question of the Month
What are the Proper Limits of Free Speech?
Each answer below receives a random book. Apologies to the entrants not included.
To answer this question one need look no further than John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty (1859): “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” He added that “all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility” – in other words, we can never be sure that the opinion we’re endeavouring to stifle is false. Mill also cautions against ‘the tyranny of the majority’ in imposing their views on a minority, and points out that ages are no more infallible than individuals, every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd. As he points out, “there is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true because, with a very little opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation.” And equally sensibly: “wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument.” He then reminds us of the case of Socrates, who was put to death for voicing unacceptable opinions, and warns of blasphemy laws as an instrument of control.
Free speech is of course not absolute and is rightly constrained by law in certain cases, notably defamation, incitement to violence, threats, and obscenity. But laws are made by governments, and Mill cautioned over 160 years ago that “the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society and diminish the power of the individual.” Fortunately, the right to free speech is enshrined in many laws, including in Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and the First Amendment to the US Constitution. The ECHR recognises the validity of restrictions in cases of national security, prevention of crime, protection of morals, the reputation of others, confidentiality, and judicial impartiality. On the whole, the existing legal principles seem to work well, but, as Mill cautioned, one must be constantly vigilant against state and societal over-reach.
Julian Stafford, Cambridge
The original purpose of free speech protections was not to protect lies or insults, but to guard individuals against oppressive governments. From Socrates’ trial to colonial censorship, rulers have suppressed dissent whenever possible. Free speech has proved essential to building societies that are not merely ruled, but genuinely free. So free speech is not an end in itself. Rather, it safeguards three essential goods: individual freedom (the dignity to think and speak with autonomy), truth-seeking (the open contest of ideas), and self-governance (the ability to criticize rulers and hold them accountable). To preserve these essential goods today, governments should not have wide latitude to decide what is true. Once granted that power, they will use it to silence dissent. Instead, the role of government is twofold: (1) Protect free expression constitutionally, leaving little room for government to exploit temporary crises as excuses to silence dissent; and (2) Require transparency in the (eg digital) public square rather than the current trend of ‘policing truth’. Governments and companies alike make poor arbiters of truth. Regulation should not silence voices, but help citizens evaluate them. Media platforms should be required to provide users with context, including clear disclosures of who pays for ads, stronger vetting of accounts, and flags indicating the country of origin of posts.
The proper limits of free speech, then, are those that prevent government overreach while promoting a public sphere where citizens can exercise autonomy, pursue truth, and govern themselves with clarity and courage.
Jake Wilson, Littleton, Colorado
Sir Karl Popper defined an ‘open’ society as an association of free individuals whose activities are guided by a mutual respect for one another’s rights. Other philosophers, most notably Isaiah Berlin, have emphasised that in the exercise of liberties in an open society conflicts may ensue: engaging in freedom of expression may infringe the rights of others not to be the recipients of hate speech, for example.
Much debate currently revolves around the question of what, if any, protection can be afforded to recipients of hate speech. One could argue that a prosecution thus pursued could be an attempt to apply Mill’s harm principle [Do what you will, but no harm]. But can the harm principle provide the parameters whereby it can be judged whether or not the line has been crossed that divides opinion, expression, or advocacy from incitement? Mill never provided satisfactory criteria to distinguish between them, and extensively publicised difficulties arising from attempted prosecutions under ‘non-crime hate speech’ law in the UK attest to the continuing intractability of this problem.
For AC Graying, prosecutions for hate speech “can only be justifiably linked to aspects of people they cannot choose – sex, sensuality, ethnicity, age and disability if any.” For him, freedom of speech should be deemed violated only in limited, one-off, compelling cases. Does, for example, President Macron’s decision to seek legal redress for assertions on social media that his wife has transgendered count as hate speech litigation? Or are the Macrons simply taking offence at personally hurtful but not necessarily illegal assertions? Can an unacceptable degree of harm be proved? The final judgement is unlikely to satisfy either party in the dispute.
Therefore, the question remains as to what ought to be the basic principles underlying legally allowable expressive acts. But, it must be incumbent on every citizen of an open, liberal society to adhere to its core values – particularly those of tolerance, compassion, respect, truthfulness, and the acknowledgment of rights and responsibilities. To ignore these values is surely to transgress the proper limits to freedom of speech.
David Cope, Telford
I will use the term ‘freedom of expression’ to refer to all possible forms of expression, including verbal, written, and artistic. These limits cannot be defined mathematically: one can only estimate if a potential expression will exceed the limit. In an autocracy, there may be no legal system at all, and the regime alone decides on the measures to be taken after any expression. The issue is therefore only relevant in a democracy. In a democracy, the theoretical foundation of measures to be taken must be examined in advance. A common example of such a category is Hate Speech. Because there are multiple categories, there are also multiple limits. However, if one attempts to create a ranking of expressions in order of increasing extremity, regardless of their categories, only one limit is needed, beyond which all expression is outlawed. Many factors will play a role in judging expressions, such as the context, medium, agent, etc. But instead of ranking the individual expressions, it may be more effective to rank classes in terms of extremity. The most extreme class is the one to focus on first, to determine what the most extreme expressions are. This class can then be used as a reference point for the other classes. Only expressions in the most extreme classes of this ranking are to be considered as exceeding the limit and are deprived of freedom of expression.
Now the questions become what the most extreme expressions are, and how they can be identified. The most extreme expressions will undoubtedly have the most extreme negative consequences. As social disruption can be understood as the most extreme state, expressions that will lead to that belong to this most extreme class.
Teije Euverman, Rotterdam
It might help if we make a distinction between speech as expression and speech as action, recognizing that every statement we make consists of both. On one hand, speech is always an expression of what is running through one’s mind; on the other, it’s an action that often leads to other actions or reactions. I would argue that the limit of free speech has to do with speech as action, while speech as expression must be protected. Take for instance the popular illustration for a limit on free speech: screaming ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theater. On one hand, ‘Fire!’ as an expression of what’s running through one’s mind is innocent in itself – say the individual fell asleep during the performance, had a dream that the theater was on fire, and woke up physically responding. Or say there was a real fire. In both cases, this speech as expression is perfectly benign. The only issue that pops up here is speech as action. And the determining factor is intent: what did the man who shouts ‘Fire!’ intend to happen?
We see this principle at work in the general political discourse these days and the false information that plagues it. Again intent is everything here, in that we have to make a distinction between mis information (which results from the limited facts we have available to us) and disinformation, which is intentionally offered to obtain some kind of advantage. Think Trump or Charles Manson. Trump or Manson having their petty and dangerous thoughts, and even expressing them, is hardly an issue. It becomes an issue when their expressions, as intended actions, lead to other actions that cause harm. Manson, when he suggested that some Hollywood elites needed to die, clearly orchestrated murder whether he killed anyone himself or not. Trump, likewise, while expressing himself, which is protected under free speech, clearly also engaged in the action of treason by inspiring his followers to storm Capitol Hill.
DE Tarkington, Bellevue, NE
Limits on free speech may be justified if more than the mere sharing of a view is intended. A mob boss ordering a murder is not simply making a statement, but wants and expects his (or her) speech act to result in murder. A speech act intended to elicit action has the moral status of the action to be elicited. If the intended action is positive, all well and good. However, when the intended action is harmful, it is reasonable to penalise the speech that causes it. Even if violence is not certain to ensue, someone wanting what they say to cause harm with at least a possibility of it coming to pass is culpable of violent intent. They’re on a par with someone swinging their fists wildly, hoping that they make contact. On the other hand, saying “I wish so-and-so were dead”, as an exaggerated expression of distaste, without any real desire or belief that it will happen, is acceptable, even though many would find it distasteful.
Another consideration is that the freedom to express an opinion does not imply the freedom to force that opinion on someone: expression should be prevented from tipping over into harassment. Deciding where this tipping point is can be a difficult, but not impossible, call. But strikers on a picket line threatening (and really meaning) violence to those still working are not exercising legitimate free speech. Some anti-abortion campaigners complain about being prevented from praying outside clinics. But prayers are addressed to God, who can hear them wherever you are, even if they’re not spoken aloud. Furthermore, such campaigners do not lack other opportunities to share their views. So is it harassment? As a final example, speech denigrating someone simply for how they are can hardly be seen as anything other than harassment.
Paul Western, Bath
The argument that freedom of speech should be limited when it is threatening to hurt another person makes sense to me. However, this limit is so grey that it’s impossible for most of us to explain coherently how to set clear boundaries. I think the problem lies deeper, in that freedom of opinion more closely matches the right that ‘freedom of speech’ is intended to protect.
We naturally tend to operate like this in daily life, in that we can have opinions but watch our mouths. For example, at grandma’s house: “It’s okay if you don’t like the dinner, but if you don’t, just tell her you’re full.” Of course, the question posed here is dealing with more pressing issues than grandma’s feelings. What if someone thinks one race is inferior to another? Racial discrimination is frowned upon in many places, and most people would agree with this condemnation. If someone states that they are going to hurt another group of people, I too think a limit should be placed on this speech, since it is indicating potential harm to another person. However, what if someone says that they believe a race to be inferior, but do not suggest that they or others may try to harm them? Although disturbing on many fronts, their opinion is not directly harming anyone. So I think we cannot limit this opinion, just as we cannot limit someone for believing a religion, or not. So I think it is opinion that should be free (whether verbal or non-verbal), not freedom of speech. Just as at grandma’s dinner, we can think whatever we want, but we need to be careful how we express it publicly.
Philippa Lieber, Langnau am Albis, Switzerland
We protect expression not because words are sacred, but because, over time, open dialogue tends to increase the accuracy of our collective understanding. So the freedom to speak is a tool for the discovery and testing of truth, and its moral weight rests on the expectation that, by allowing ideas to compete without restraint, societies are more likely to approach reason, evidence, and justice. But if that’s the justification, then that freedom cannot be absolute. A principle justified by its consequences must be sensitive to conditions under which those consequences no longer hold. When expression diminishes the capacity for reasoned discourse – for example, when people spread falsehoods, erode trust in evidence, or coerce others into silence – then it begins to subvert the very rationale by which it was defended. To treat such speech as protected is not to extend freedom, but to erode its foundation. This does not mean that offence, disagreement, or error justify censorship. Quite the opposite: the right to challenge, provoke, and even to be wrong remains essential to intellectual and moral progress. Yet where the demonstrable effect of expression is not to enlarge the space of reason but destroy it – where the harm to truth, safety, or civic order from allowing speech outweighs the harm of constraining it – limitation becomes not the enemy of liberty but its logical expression. The proper limits of free speech, then, are drawn by proportion: we restrict only when the evidence shows with high confidence that permitting those expressions would do greater damage to the project of truth-seeking and human flourishing than a considered and justified restraint.
Freedom of speech is not an end in itself; it is an instrument of collective reason. To defend it properly is to defend the conditions under which reason can still be heard.
John Hutchinson, Worthing, West Sussex
Categories of speech not protected under liberal democratic frameworks include expressions that incite violence, attack the other’s identity (through hate speech) or reputation (through libel or slander), threaten national security or public safety, or contain child-exploitation material. Yet how relevant and effective are such restrictions in our digitally mediated world? On one hand, almost anything can now be said in cyberspace. On the other, new regimes of content moderation have emerged – some transparent, others hidden; some fair, others far less so. Private social media companies impose their own controls that silently manipulate the visibility and reach of speech. In this environment, protecting free speech while minimizing harm requires a shift in focus. The greatest threat to free speech today is the drowning out of voices for social and global justice amid the endless flow circulating online. The most devastating consequence of the principle that ‘hate speech should be allowed if it does not incite violence’ is not only the normalization of hate speech itself, it’s also the flip side: protest speech, aimed at constructive change, is stripped of its force, left unrealized, ultimately impotent. The central question should no longer be what speech ought to be restricted, but what speech ought to be empowered.
The true challenge, then, is to safeguard authentic protest speech so that it’s not reduced to just another fragment of noise on social media. What good is it when the voice of the oppressed contends with that of the oppressor in digital spaces indifferent to material power asymmetries, as though democracy is nothing more than a meme-fuelled joust for attention? Determining the proper limits of free speech, then, requires us to identify and interrogate the mechanisms that prevent it from fulfilling its highest purpose: correcting injustice. And in our Information Age, the most serious of these mechanisms is, paradoxically, the free flow of speech.
Houman Mehrabian, Vancouver, British Columbia
By strict definition, the term ‘Free Speech’ means that one can say whatever ones wishes without fear of consequences. However, we know that what one expresses in whatever format does have consequences, intended or not. When considering if any limit should be applied to what one expresses, those limits are usually intended to prevent harm to the recipients of the message. This harm can either be about offence or incitement. But when it comes to being offensive, it is the individual or individuals who will be offended. Words or images in themselves are not offensive: it’s the way they’re perceived that causes offence. I therefore believe that free speech should never be restricted on the basis of ‘Causing Offence’. However when it comes to incitement, I feel that a limitation on free speech can and should be imposed. By incitement, I mean calling for actual harm to persons or property. For example, calling for asylum seeker hotels to be set on fire should be made illegal, whereas calling for illegal asylum seekers to be deported should not. The later is merely an opinion, whilst the former is a direct call to action to cause harm. Therefore from my perspective, the only limit to be placed on anybody expressing themselves is where there is an intention to cause harm to other people or property and not merely because it might offend somebody.
Andrew J. Davidson, East Cowes, Isle of Wight
Free speech should have no limits because the supposed ‘harm’ from speech is not inherent to the information itself, but emerges from recipients’ responses. When we examine how information causes pain, we discover that the same words can devastate one person while leaving another unaffected. A medical diagnosis, political statement, or personal insult generates different responses depending on the recipient’s beliefs, cultural background, emotional investment and other interpretive frameworks. If someone calls me ‘worthless’ and I feel hurt, that hurt is generated by my psychology, not by some objective harmful quality in their words. Someone with different self-concept or cultural conditioning might find the same words amusing or irrelevant. This proves that the pain is not a property of the information pattern itself, but rather emerges from the subjective interaction between observer and information. Therefore we cannot coherently punish speakers for causing pain that actually originates in the recipients’ subjective processing. We would essentially be punishing people for triggering others’ psychological mechanisms rather than for inflicting objective harm. The proper response is to place responsibility where the causal mechanism actually resides: with recipients. Rather than restricting speakers, we should expect people to develop critical thinking skills, emotional regulation, and information verification abilities. This approach also respects human agency, treating people as capable of managing their own cognitive and emotional responses. Moreover, restricting speech based on potential subjective responses creates an impossible standard, as almost any statement might distress someone.
Free speech maximizes the flow of information essential for truth-seeking, innovation, and democratic discourse. When we understand that information itself cannot inherently harm, the default must favor expression over restriction. The alternative – limiting speech to prevent hurt feelings – makes speakers responsible for the unknowable internal processes of all potential recipients. This places an unjustified burden on expression. If pain from information is subjective, then managing that pain is the recipient’s responsibility, not grounds for limiting the right to speak freely.
Anthony Eadington, Carlisle
Next Question of the Month
The next question is: Why Do The Evil Still Prosper? Please give and justify your answer in less than 400 words. The prize is a semi-random book from our book mountain. Email the Editor. Subject lines should be marked ‘Question of the Month’, and must be received by 10th February 2026. If you want a chance of getting a book, please include your physical address. Submission is permission to reproduce your answer.
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