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Is Comedy Good for Us?

Damaris Stock has a laugh with Plato and friends.

Most people would admit that without comedy, life would be rather bleak. But what is comedy? The word incorporates not only the theatrical genre, but humour, wit, and whatever evokes laughter in general. Defining comedy, however, may be easier than explaining why we laugh, what makes us laugh, and also how laughter may indicate whether we’re morally good people. If we find racist jokes funny, does that automatically mark us as racists, or can we appreciate the wit of a joke without being morally accountable for doing so? Or what if our friend told us their dog died and we laughed straight in their face? Would that make us morally bad? But more importantly: How – if at all – is comedy good for us?

Compared to the ancient philosophers’ notions of comedy, our perception of humour has indubitably changed. Plato thought comedy belonged to the lower human instincts, for it undermined the logos (reason) of those indulging in humorous activities. He banishes comedy altogether from his ideal state for precisely this reason. Indeed, he believed the mere fact that laughter is directed at the foibles of other people makes it malicious. Aristotle shared this view to some extent, as he admitted that many people take humour too far, but he also held that laughter in general should not be suppressed. That said, from about the fifth-century BCE in Athens – the time of Plato and Aristotle – comedy became increasingly popular, and similar to today. Aristophanes’ plays made merry with a familiar set of topics “such as politics, sexism, ageism, and racism” (‘Humour in the Ancient World’, Social Identities, 7:1, Evans & Kleijwegt, 2001).

Superiority, Incongruity & Relief

Since Plato thought that laughter is directed at the vices of inferiors, he can be seen as preempting what is known these days as the ‘superiority’ theory of laughter. This, in short, states that we laugh at the weaknesses of others in order to elevate ourselves. Thomas Hobbes, whom Andrew Stott argues is the “most famous representative of superiority theory” (Comedy: The New Critical Idiom, 2005) asserts that we laugh about other people’s faults and weaknesses to highlight our own strengths. According to Stott, this theory “operates in the absence of a joke and focuses on physical defects, personal misfortunes, and social inequality” (p.135). That said, Hobbes notes that we never laugh when others make fun of us, and concludes that “the passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others” (from ‘Of Human Nature’). This can also be seen in rhetoric: laughter can function as a weapon when used in verbal conflicts, as it emphasises the weaknesses of one’s opponent. Cicero is a prime example for this.

Unlike Hobbes, Schopenhauer argues that laughter is caused by “the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought through it in some relation, and laughter itself is just the expression of this incongruity” (The World as Will and Representation, 1818). In ‘Ethics and Comic Amusement’ (British Journal of Aesthetics, 54.1, 2014), Noël Carroll observes that according to this definition, humour “is perceived incongruity… subverting standing views of how the world is or ought to be.” He elsewhere also states that “incongruity involves deviations from a background of norms – conceptual, logical, linguistic, stereotypical” (‘Humour’, 2003). As illustration of this, he cites Charlie Chaplin “using a person as an armrest… or a table cloth as a handkerchief.” The incongruity theory is that events or behaviours defying our expectations alienate us to the extent that our only response is laughter.

Sigmund Freud offers another theory of laughter: the relief theory. This, he believes, shows that “the ego refuses to be distressed by the provocations of reality” (‘Humour’, 1961). Someone rebels against the sad, depressing, or hopeless circumstances in which they find themselves by making a jest about their own distress. Freud also argues that the ego, by joking about serious circumstances, “cannot be affected by the traumas of the external world” and “shows, in fact, that such traumas are no more than occasions for it to gain pleasure.” Hence, he points out, this way of dealing with otherwise unfortunate events is closely linked with narcissism and “the victorious assertion of the ego’s invulnerability.” Like Herbert Spencer, Freud also gives a ‘hydraulic’ explanation for laughter: both suggest that “Laughing is the audible signal that the energy required for cathexis, the accumulation of energy around an idea, has been lifted and can now be dispersed in a pleasurable fashion” (Comedy, Stott). For example, hostility against a certain racial group is sometimes relieved by making a joke about the people belonging to this group.

Artwork © Simon Ellinas 2026. Please visit caricatures.org.uk.

Laughing Acceptably

These three theories of laughter may explain how laughter comes about in certain situations, but even if valid they haven’t shown whether laughing is good for us, nor whether the violation of ethical norms in comedy automatically makes us immoral. In ‘Ethics and Comic Amusement’, Carroll argues that most people find at least some kind of humour or jokes immoral – a theory he calls ‘Moderate Comic Moralism’. On the other hand, in Comedy (1956), Wylie Sypher claims that once we realise that we’re “caught in a dishonest or stupid society… we can liberate ourselves by a confident, wise laughter that brings a catharsis of discontent… If we laugh wisely enough at ourselves and at others, the sense of guilt, dismay, anxiety, or fear can be lifted.” This assumption is striking as it implies that so long as we ‘laugh wisely’, we should not feel bad about making or laughing at inappropriate or immoral jokes. Moreover, laughter is here seen as being inextricably entwined with a feeling of liberation and relief from discontent rather than increasing people’s negative emotions towards a certain topic or group. Hence, Sypher believes that the comedian allows us to laugh at the imperfections of the world, and that laughing at “evil and error means that we have surmounted them”.

Other scholars have also pointed out that comedy creates distance from the world; but it remains unclear if this means it also establishes moral distance, in the sense that we aren’t morally accountable for our immoral jokes. There certainly are occasions inappropriate for jesting; yet, knowing that it is inappropriate to laugh in a certain situation does not prevent us from doing so.

Meanwhile, Ted Cohen argues in Jokes: Philosophical Thoughts on Joking Matters (1999) that no one can reliably determine when it is acceptable to joke about a serious topic such as death because it depends on our moral sensibility. By this he means that we alone can decide whether it is appropriate to tell a joke or act serious, and our decision ultimately depends on our moral standards. That said, Aaron Smuts asserts in ‘The Ethics of Humor: Can Your Sense of Humor be Wrong?’ (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 13(3), 2010) that merely having the knowledge necessary to understand a joke does not make us immoral. He also believes that even if a person laughs at an immoral joke, it is still impossible to make any assumptions about their beliefs. Additionally, Simon Critchley argues that “true humour does not wound a specific victim and always contains self-mockery” because for him “The object of laughter is the subject who laughs” (On Humour, 2002). Seeing laughter in this way as being about self-mockery creates distance from the jest itself and focuses on the laughing subject first and foremost. In this way, humour reaches an entirely new dimension. If humour is subjective, its function also depends on the person who laughs or makes a joke.

All Together Now

Generally, comedy can have a therapeutic as well as a bonding function. First I shall focus on the latter.

Henri Bergson argues in his classic essay Laughter that “To understand laughter, we must put it back into its natural environment, which is society, and above all must we determine the utility of its function, which is a social one.” In ‘Humour and Health Promotion’ (Health Education Journal, 62(2), 2003), Ann Snowden elaborates on Bergson’s thought that laughter fulfils a social function by differentiating between ‘laughing with’ and ‘laughing at’. For her, the former “can fulfil a bonding function between individuals or within a group”, as laughing with people is non-hostile in most cases. Laughing at, however, is clearly hostile, and can function as a means “to put down individuals, or to force them to conform to norms of a group.”

Snowden also points out that the bonding function of laughter is only one of many. Indeed, she says that humour has been found to have over 700 functions, which can be subsumed under the categories “defence and coping; the expression of positive and negative affect; and power-based.” Humour’s social function, and particularly its bonding function, I would argue, remains central, since laughing with people establishes a connection. People who laugh together know they have something in common. Therefore, laughing with reveals similarities, and the connection arising from these similarities brings us closer to people and makes us feel well-disposed to them.

Ha Ha Phew

Yet comedy not only has a bonding function, but also a therapeutic one. Norman Cousins, for instance, wrote about how he used comedy and laughter to recover from ankylosing spondylitis. He uses this example as part of attempting to prove that the body has the power to heal itself and that positive emotions play an important role in that process (Anatomy of an Illness as Perceived by the Patient, 1979). His case is quite astonishing; but whether his recovery was linked to laughter, other treatments, or perhaps a combination of causes, remains unclear.

Alongside Cousins’ amateur attempt to show that laughter has positive effects on health, there have been scientific studies too. Indeed, there are over fifty published scientific articles investigating the connection between laughter and health (see The Psychology of Humour, R.O. Martin, 2007, p.311). And members of the AATH (Association for Applied and Therapeutic Humor) specifically focus on ways in which humour can be applied to sectors such as medicine, psychotherapy, and education.

One study found that both laughter and smiling improve a person’s mood, and that even forced laughter has this result. This indicates that our brain does not fully differentiate between acting happy and being happy (‘Effects of Laughing, Smiling, and Howling on Mood’, Psychological Reports, 91, Neuhoff & Schaefer, 2002). Another study found that after having watched comedy films, individuals find themselves to have higher pain tolerance. There is even evidence suggesting that humour can entail a reduction of post-surgical pain. These pain-reducing effects, however, are more likely to be “due to amusement-related positive emotion, rather than to laughter per se” (Martin, Ibid).

One of the best-known humorous approaches to therapy is Albert Ellis’s Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), which is based on the thought that “people develop psychological disturbance as a consequence of having irrational beliefs, dysfunctional attitudes, and unrealistic absolute standards” (Martin, p.338). The therapist uses “humorous exaggeration and even sarcasm… to challenge and dispute clients’ false beliefs.” Why would this work? Perhaps it draws on all three theories of laughter discussed earlier. The therapist’s exaggerated humour elevates them and lifts them above the client (Superiority Theory), whereas their use of sarcasm enables the client to realise the absurdities of their own beliefs (Incongruity Theory), and by laughing about these irrational views, the clients rid themselves of their negative emotions (Relief Theory).

In any case, there’s now a reasonable body of scientific evidence that laughter can have positive effects on our physical health. Comedy can also help us to maintain our mental health by presenting us with a way of coping with issues in our lives. Satire, for instance, comments on current affairs by using “humor as a weapon, attacking ideas, behaviours, institutions, or individuals by encouraging us to laugh at them” (‘Laughing in the Face of Climate Change?’, Science Communication, 36(4), Lisa Bore & Grace Reid, 2014). Hence, the attraction of satire lies in its ability to offer “social and political commentary while entertaining audiences” (Ibid). Aspects of relief theory can also be found in satire for laughing at a current political topic that has reached a certain level of common interest. This allows us to gain relief from the energy built up through our direct or indirect engagement with the topic.

Why Laugh?

Throughout this article various applications and impacts of comedy have become apparent. But now I shall attempt to investigate the desire for comedy. Why is it that people want to laugh? Why is it that comedians joke about serious topics? And why do we laugh at their jokes even with the knowledge that the jests are potentially offensive?

I would argue that comedy enables us to deal with events. Stott references Mel Brooks’ song ‘Springtime for Hitler’ in the movie The Producers, to show that comedians push “the limits of bad taste and wrong-headedness” (Comedy, 2005, p.120). But this musical number also demonstrates that laughing about the past – even about a horrific event such as the Holocaust – enables the audience to cope with the cruelty and terror of past events. In this context, laughter can also be analysed in terms of the relief theory, since this not only means laughing at the stupidity of the Nazis but also enables us to gain relief from the psychological horror of their historical acts.

However, the need for comedy in our society arises not only from a wish to deal with and overcome past events, but also from a feeling of helplessness or inferiority resulting from our constantly being at the mercy of those in power. Stott correctly points out that comedy allows us to respond “to social expectations, as the norms of etiquette usually prevent us from directly insulting others or broaching taboo subjects” (Comedy, p.139). Jesting about politicians, authorities, or other (self-)important people also offers us a platform for our thoughts and opinions. And frequently, if some group is at the mercy of an ideology, a politician or a party, the only way for them to express their opinion is through jokes. Also, by putting them into words – into jokes, to be precise – a comedian can create a feeling of togetherness and a connection between those of the same opinion. Hence again, the social function of laughter.

Laughing at offensive jokes may seem immoral to some people, but considering the arguments I’ve discussed, I think in general it does not make us morally bad people. At most, laughing at crass jokes can be insensitive in certain situations; but as we have seen, that depends on the moral sensibility of the listeners. Furthermore, understanding a joke and appreciating its wit does not imply a lack of morals on behalf of the laughing audience. Comedy is subjective, and it is impossible to make any assumptions about a person’s moral standards only by looking at what they find funny.

Laughter has proven health benefits. I hope I have shown that comedy also has a bonding function, and that this is an important aspect of laughter. Although there may be some dour opponents of humour who sympathise with Plato’s opinion of comedy, the psychological as well as the physiological benefits of comedy cannot be denied.

Damaris Stock is an independent researcher with a background in Classics (BA & MLitt). She holds a DBA from Paris School of Business.