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Classics

Tractatus Theologico-Politicus by Baruch Spinoza

Hilarius Bogbinder looks at the book that got Baruch Spinoza barred from his synagogue.

“A book forged in Hell by a renegade Jew and the Devil, and issued with the knowledge of Jan de Witt.” The enemies of Baruch de Spinoza (1632-1677) were not kind when describing his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670). The claim of the place of drafting and the co-authorship of the book is dubious; but it was certain that the book fundamentally clashed with Jewish and Christian theology of the time. Its questioning of the mere possibility of miracles ruffled feathers. So too did Spinoza’s uncompromising defence of democracy.

To present-day readers, the Dutch-born thinker might be better known as the author of the highly complex Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata (Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order, 1677). Published after his death, the Ethics outlined Spinoza’s philosophy in the style of the ancient mathematician Euclid. But in his own lifetime, it was his Treatise on Theology and Politics that made Spinoza famous, or rather, infamous. And in many ways his Tractatus presents a better, or in any case, a far more readable account of his thinking.

Certainly, the book caused controversy. Almost a century after its publication even a heretic like David Hume was dismissive of Spinoza’s supposedly ‘true atheism’. Hume calls his pantheistic theory of the universe as a ‘hideous hypothesis’ (Treatise of Human Nature, pp.240-241). Yet the book had been admired by none other than the aging Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). He commented that his younger Dutch colleague “had out-thrown him a bar’s length, for he [Hobbes] durst not write so boldly.”

Spinoza certainly speaks through the ages. At a time when the Bible and the Quran are used to, respectively, justify opposition to LGBT groups in America and deny girls the right to education in Afghanistan, Spinoza’s Tractatus is sadly relevant and timely, even 350-plus years after its original publication.

Spinoza’s were the last major works of philosophy to have been published in Latin. Only his treatise on the rainbow and his Treatise on God, Man, and Well-Being (Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch, en deszelvs Welstand) were written in Dutch, and those were never published during his lifetime. Spinoza had learned Latin from Francis van der Erden, who also introduced the young man to the philosophy of René Descartes (1596-1650). On the urging of his tutor, Spinoza wrote a short treatise about Descartes’ philosophy based on Euclid’s principles, The Principles of René Descartes’ Philosophy Demonstrated by the Geometric Method (1663).

Spinoza’s Radicalism

It’s often said that Spinoza was an austere man who began training as a rabbi and learned the skill of grinding lenses (Jewish clergymen traditionally had a trade to fall back on). In fact, he never completed his rabbinical training, but he did grind lenses. He also taught in Van der Erden’s school. He refused generous academic offers. and even declined a professorship at the University of Heidelberg, as he feared that would prevent him from speaking his mind. All this has given him a rather ascetic air. This is a bit unfair. He was not a complete bore, he once defined man as “an animal capable of laughter” (Ethics 2, Prop XL), and wrote that a wise person would be invigorated by “eating and drinking and by [watching] sport” (Ethics 4, Prop. XLV). But these were not the views that caused outrage. He received notoriety not only because Tractatus inaugurated critical thinking about religion, but also because he drew political implications from his theology. These implications shaped the politics of the modern era.

At the time Tractatus was written, Spinoza’s academic compatriots were in no doubt that Jesus had performed miracles such as turning water into wine and bringing dead people back to life. Spinoza categorically rejected this idea: “nature cannot be contravened, but… preserves a fixed and immutable order” (p,82); and, he went on, to believe in miracles is “a mere absurdity” (Ibid). Generally, he gave short shrift of any supernatural interpretation of the Bible, and stated categorically that when a literal interpretation of it clashes with reason, “it must be interpreted in a different manner, ie, metaphorically” (p.102). Spinoza proposed that we “separate ourselves from the crowd.” Instead of ‘rashly accepting’ the Bible as preached by the churches, we use the same critical mindset we use when we should study the universe, since “the method of interpreting Scripture does not differ widely from interpreting nature” (p.99).

Spinoza was nothing if not radical, but he certainly didn’t make life easy for himself. Born of Sephardi Jewish parents who had escaped Portugal and settled in Amsterdam, he was a member of the Jewish congregation in his native city; but his unorthodox views on God and Scripture caused him to be expelled from the synagogue. Indeed, on 27 July 1656, the Talmud Torah congregation of Amsterdam issued an unusually harsh writ of cherem: “Cursed be he by day and cursed be he by night; cursed be he when he lies down, and cursed be he when he rises up… We order that no one should communicate with him orally or in writing, or show him any favour, or stay with him under the same roof, or within four ells of him, or read anything composed or written by him.”

Still, being excommunicated meant Spinoza was free to speak his mind, more or less. He fraternised with free thinkers (that is, atheists), and became a friend of Jan de Witt, the liberal-minded Raadpensionaris of the United Dutch Provinces (a kind of Prime Minister). With influential friends in high places, and in the company of secular-minded friends, he was confident to write that the books of Moses, or Pentateuch, as the first five books of the Bible are known, were ‘compilations’ that were not written by the prophet; rather, that “events therein were recorded as having happened in old time” (Tractatus, p.121).

Spinoza’s statements also caused concern outside the Jewish community, and not merely for theological reasons. Spinoza was not just interested in metaphysics; he had a political purpose – to rid political discussions of irrelevant superstition. This, he thought. was a source of tyranny. Spinoza was not opposed to the teachings of religions, which could be “summed up in to love one’s neighbour” (p.102). However, “We have shown”, wrote he, “that Scripture does not teach philosophy, but merely obedience” (p.190). This divinely-sanctioned obedience, in his view, only served to perpetuate tyranny. Furthermore, basing decisions on supposed divine motives resulted in a kind of intellectual laziness. This, in his view, characterised religious fanatics, who will not “cease from asking the causes, until at last they fly to the will of God, the refuge of ignorance” (Ethics 1, Appendix).

Living at the same time as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) – whom he had read and admired – Spinoza agreed that states were established by a covenant or in Hobbes’ terms, a social contract. Spinoza wrote that “in order that men may be able to live in harmony, they cede their natural rights” (Ethics 4, Prop. Xxxvii).

Like Hobbes, Spinoza founded his political philosophy on a grand philosophical system, which was ultimately based on his idea that God and nature are one. As he summed it up, “ Deus sive Natura: God, or nature.” To elaborate, in the Ethics he wrote that God is “the immanent not the transitive cause of things”, and that he could only be conceived by two of his ‘attributes’, namely ‘thought’ and ‘extension’ (Ethics 1, XIV2). Based on this, it has been said that Spinoza was a pantheist. This is somewhat anachronistic, as this term was only introduced after his death by English mathematician Joseph Raphson (1668-1712). Certainly, Spinoza had a rather abstract conception of the Supreme Being, and he rejected the view of “those who imagine God to be like a man, composed of body and soul, and subject to passions” (Ethics 1, Prop.XV). Moreover, for Spinoza, salvation was not in living in bliss in the hereafter; rather, “Blessedness is nothing but the peace of mind which springs from the intuitive knowledge of God” (Ethics 4, Appendix IV). With such a view of the world, it’s impossible to maintain a political system based on fear of the afterlife, as the divine right of kings might be said to be based.

Politically, Spinoza was no less secular than Hobbes, yet he departed from his English contemporary in fundamental ways. As he himself wrote, “the difference between Hobbes and I consists in this: that I ever preserve the natural right intact, so that the supreme power in a state has no more right over the subject than is proportionate to the power by which it is superior to the subject” (Letter to Jarig Jelles, June 2, 1674). One of these rights pertained to free speech: “Men thinking in diverse and contradictory fashion cannot, without disastrous results, be compelled to speak only according to the dictates of supreme power” (Tractatus, p.208). He was also explicit in his support for government by the people. Foreshadowing what has become known as ‘the wisdom of the crowds’, he declared that “In a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared [than in a dictatorship], for it is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it is a large one, should agree in an irrational design and, moreover, the basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and to bring men, as far as possible, under the control of reason” (p.264). What’s remarkable about Spinoza’s Treatise is that it went far beyond the liberal political doctrine of his benefactor and friend Jan De Witt. The latter was progressive, but still an aristocrat. Not so Spinoza:

“We cannot doubt that [democracy] is the best form of government and open to the fewest objections, since it is one in harmony with human nature. In a democracy (the most natural form of government…) everyone submits to the control of authority over their actions but not over his judgement and reason; that is seeing that all cannot think alike, the voice of the majority has the force of law, subject to repeal if circumstances bring about a change of opinion” (Chap.XX).

For this reason, “In proportion as the power of free judgement is withheld we depart from the natural condition of mankind, and consequently, the government becomes tyrannical” (Chap.XX). Thus, Spinoza can be seen as the first political philosopher to defend the idea of the rule of law as essential to a democracy; hence “a government which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical, and it is considered an abuse of sovereignty and an usurpation of the rights of subjects to seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or rejected as false” (p.261). A democracy was hence preferable on philosophical grounds, as this system of government will allow philosophical speculation as well as religious freedom. Moreover, as Spinoza wrote with considerable eloquence, “he who seeks to regulate everything by law is more likely to arouse vices than to reform them” (Ibid).

Ends & Legacies

As a philosopher, Spinoza largely refrained from real world examples. But he made an exception: Tractatus Theologico-Politicus ends with a somewhat effusive, but largely accurate, praise of his native city (p.264):

“In order to prove that from such freedom, which cannot be checked by the exercise of the sovereign power, and that men’s actions can easily be kept in bounds though their opinions be at open variance, it will be well to cite an example… The city of Amsterdam reaps the fruits of this freedom in its own great prosperity and in the admiration of all other people. For in this most flourishing state, and most splendid city, men of every nation and religion live together in greatest harmony, and ask no questions before trusting their goods to a fellow citizen… whether he be rich or poor… His religion or sect is considered of no importance for it has no effect before the judges in gaining or losing a cause, and there is no sect so despised that its followers, provided they harm no one, are deprived the protection of the magisterial authority.”

He spoke too soon. Two years later, Jan De Witt was blamed for an invasion by French and English troops, and was killed by an angry mob (somewhat bizarrely, they even cannibalised the corpse). For the rest of his life, Spinoza lived in fear and seclusion. He died a few years later, seemingly due to a lung complication caused by glass dust.

But Spinoza’s legacy lived on. For Romantics like the poets Goethe, Novalis, and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, he became a hero. But his lasting legacy was to pave the way for democracy as well as a system of politics based on free speech, reason, and sound argument. As he wrote, “If ignorance be removed, stupidity… is taken away also” (Ethics, I, Appendix). To this we can only copy the great man himself and say at the end of the argument ‘Q.E.D.’, or quod erat demonstrandum – the Latin shorthand in mathematical proofs that means ‘This was proved’.

Hilarius Bogbinder is a Danish-born writer who studied politics and theology at Oxford University.